Sedlacek knew Schnieper well. He also knew that by the time the war ended, both Schnieper and Roessler were plagued by financial problems. Both were struggling to make ends meet as free-lance journalists. Sometime before his departure for Prague Sedlacek introduced his successor as Czech military attaché to Schnieper. The successor, in turn, introduced Schnieper to Captain Rudolf Wolf of Czech intelligence.
In the summer of 1947 Wolf asked Schnieper to ask Roessler whether he was willing to resume intelligence work. Lucy agreed. With Schnieper serving as intermediary, Roessler supplied the Czechs and thus the Soviets—with information, mostly military, on the forces, dispositions, weapons, etc., of the US, England, and France in West Germany, as well as the budding West German military force. They were sentenced by a Swiss court on 5 November 1953 to a year and nine months respectively; but the time already spent in detention, nine months for each, was counted. Released in early 1954, Roessler died in 1958.
This bald account sounds mundane—a trivial, almost irrelevant epilogue to the glamorous days of World War II. Yet a moment's reflection shows that such a view is unjustified. Lucy's first phase lasted for only a little more than two years, his second for six. The second phase lacks the high drama of the first, but the fact remains that Roessler and Schnieper delivered valuable classified information to the Soviets, via the Czechs, in the post-war period as well. And the intriguing question of sources looms large in both phases.
Moreover, it is not likely that the two periods are unconnected. Lucy obviously had human sources for his 1947-1953 reporting, even though his defense heavily stressed the amount of information that he had gleaned from the newspapers. If we can unearth some of these people, we can expect to find links to the sources of 1941-1944.
One contact, according to newspaper accounts of the trial, was a Mrs. Theresa Hildebrand of the staff of a Chicago magazine called Common Cause. Roessler asked the Czechs if they wanted to add 1,500 francs monthly to his pay so that he could extend his coverage to the USA through Mrs. Hildebrand and her contacts. The indictment of Roessler said, however, that he had merely copied the names of Mrs. Hildebrand and others from Common Causeand that they were not implicated.
A professional source who examined some of the microfilmed reports prepared by Roessler and Schnieper for passage to Prague concluded that part of these had come not only from the Blank office39 but specifically from the office of Joachim Oster, the son of General Hans Oster.
Joachim Oster, usually called Achim, was born on 20 February 1914 in Dresden. He entered the army in 1933 as an officer candidate with the Second Artillery Regiment. He was promoted to first lieutenant in 1938, to captain in 1941, to major in 1943. He attained general's rank during the post-war years.
In 1949 he began work as secretary to Dr. Josef Mueller, who was a friend of his father and a member of the 20th of July group. Oster held this position for at least six years. During this period Mueller reportedly headed a group which worked for a neutralist, pro-USSR Germany. Other members of the group, besides Mueller and Oster, included Otto John and Georges Blun, whom we have already mentioned as "Long" of the Rote Drei.
In 1950 Joachim Oster was appointed to the Blank Office. He served as chief of the security section of Amt Blank (Department IV/A/6) and in this capacity conducted liaison with the British, Americans, and French, as well as with other Germans. In January 1956 he was transferred to other, presumably less sensitive, duties in the Ministry of Defense. About September of 1958 he was posted to Madrid as the military attaché. There he reportedly established contact with the old Spanish Loyalist, Gil Robles.
The Return of Agnes
The unidentified contact of Roessler who reported in 1955 that Goerdeler, Gisevius, "General Boelitz," and "the predecessor of Canaris" were World War II sources of Lucy, also said that as of the reporting date Roessler was still in contact with one Lemmer, who was either in the Blank Office or who had a contact therein. Other Phase II sources were said to be one Thormann and a man named Borchheimer, who was a professor at the University of Heidelberg.
There can be little doubt that the first of these is the same Ernst Lemmer who, as "Agnes," was a Rote Drei source during World War II.
Dr. Werner Thormann
Thormann is believed to be Dr. Werner Thormann. He was born in Germany, acquired Austrian citizenship through naturalization, but until 1933 remained mainly in Germany, where he was chief editor of the weekly Deutsche Republik and the Rhein-Mainische Volkszeitung. At an undetermined time he served Dr. Josef Wirth as his secretary, probably during Wirth's 1921-1922 period. After the Nazis' seizure of power he moved to Paris, and from September 1939 to May 1940 he was an editor and speaker on the German Freedom Station there. In July 1940 the US Government granted him an emergency visa, and he spent the war years in the US and Switzerland. As of April 1947 he was the editor of Zukunft(Future). He died sometime before 1958.
Professor Max Horkheimer
"Borchheimer" appears to be a garble for Professor Max Horkheimer, born 14 February 1895 in Stuttgart. About 1928 he became head of the Institute for Social Research, founded at the University of Frankfurt to disseminate Marxist Studies. When Hitler came to power, the Institute moved to Geneva. In 1934 Horkheimer came to the US and there established the main offices of the Institute under the sponsorship of Columbia University. By 1948 he was attempting to reestablish a branch of the Institute at Frankfurt am Main, and by the following year he was a member of the faculty of the University of Frankfurt.
There are reports that he is or was a fellow-traveller, once closely associated with the Lenin Institute of Moscow; that he has or has had Soviet intelligence ties; and that be had been considered for the position of psychological advisor to the West German Defense Ministry (Amt Blank) although he was an opponent of the Bonn government.
There is no proof that Horkheimer provided Lucy with information after World War II. And if he did so, the system of communication remains unknown. It is noted, however, that one Emile Siegmund Grunberg was the son of Karl Grunberg, the first director of the Institute for Social Research. He and his brother Karl were translators for the International Labor Organization in Geneva. Emile and his wife knew Alexander Abramson, alias "Isaac"; Rachel Duebendorfer, alias "Sissy"; Paul Boettcher; and probably other members of the Rote Drei network.
There is, however, a difficulty, a blur in the logic, inherent in the assumption that Josef Wirth, Joachim Oster, possibly Josef Mueller, Ernst Lemmer, Werner Thormann, and Max Horkheimer were Lucy's sources, or among those sources, during the period of 1947-1953. During this period the Soviets could have established contact with any of them much more simply and directly than through a procedure whereby they met with Roessler in Germany or Switzerland, Roessler passed reports to Schnieper and thus the Czechs, and the Czech service gave the product to the Soviets. Lemmer, in particular, was far better placed than Roessler to serve as the central collection point.
The question may be partly resolved by one of Roessler's major courtroom arguments in his defense. He maintained that almost every thing that he sold to the Czechs was compiled from overt sources, chiefly newspapers, and that the information given to him by his German friends was much less important. The claim may be true, for people who knew Lucy considered him a truthful man. The remainder of the answer is that the act of providing Lucy with intelligence would in no way have precluded the direct provision of the same or other information by the same sources to Soviet intelligence officers, or to both German services, East and West, or to practically anyone else. For these men, Lucy included, were great equivocators, adept, as the German phrase has it, at carrying water on both shoulders.
Lucy the Mercenary
There can be no doubt that Lucy himself was motivated chiefly, if not entirely, by mercenary considerations. Here are a few excerpts from the traffic flowing between Moscow and Rado:
"12.3.1943 . . . . Agree to buy Plan Ostwall for 5,000 francs. Does Lucy know whether these documents are genuine and reliable?"
"10. and 11.11.1943 . . . . Sissy states that Lucy group no longer works when the salary stops."
"14.11.1943 . . . . Please tell Lucy in our name that ... his group will surely be paid according to his demands. We are ready to reward him richly for his information."
"9.12.1943 . . . . Inform Lucy not to worry about the money situation."
During the post-war phase Lucy submitted somewhat more than one hundred reports. He and Scbnieper were paid a total sum of between 33,000 and 48,000 Swiss francs. Lucy kept three-fourths of this sum.
During his career Roessler provided intelligence to services of the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, and England, at a minimum.
Malcolm Muggeridge commented in The Observer, 8 January 1967, on Lucy's cupidity: "I seem to detect a professional touch in the assiduity with which Roessler, when the Russians at last realized his worth, screwed out of them 7,000 Swiss francs a month by way of retainer and a lot of generous supplementary bonuses besides—by Red standards, a very high rate of remuneration."
And Wirth? His record suggests that he became a Soviet agent of influence in the early 1920's. A year or two after the signing of the Treaty of Rapallo he made the first of several trips to the USSR, where he conducted financial negotiations involving forestry rights and the construction of a railroad. He was pleased that German men and officers were being trained on Russian soil, in evasion of the Versailles Treaty, even though his own regime was called the "government of fulfillment" because it was supposedly carrying out all of its obligations under that treaty. The. Rote Drei traffic itself shows that Moscow at times directed Rado to obtain intelligence from Wirth during World War II.
Yet he was also in contact with Walter Schellenberg, through Richard Grossmann and perhaps in other ways as well. Was be, then, withholding from the SD his relationship with the Soviets, as well as what he knew about the 20th of July conspirators? The answer to the first part of this question is probably yes, but the same cannot be said about the second, at least not with much assurance. Himmler was prepared to listen to proposals that were treasonable from a Nazi point of view whenever he deemed the circumstances secure. There are clear indications in the record that he envisaged himself as Hitler's successor. He once told Canaris that he knew perfectly well the identities of all the anti-Hitler plotters. In short, if Wirth and others were betraying the conspiracy to Schellenberg, they were also being double-crossed by Himmler who hoped that the plan to assassinate the Fuehrer would succeed.
The Soviets, the SD—anyone else? Wirth's major Rote Drei contact appears to have been the French journalist, Georges Blun. In 1940 he made a trip to Paris in order to inform the French government personally of the military situation in Germany after the invasion of Norway. He made similar trips after the war. There is a report of contact with the Deuxieme Bureau.
And there was some contact, on the record unproductive, with the OSS during the war.
Ernst Lemmer's intelligence contacts were discussed earlier: USSR, Swiss, and SD as a minimum.
Hans Bernd Gisevius joined the Nazis, worked in the German police and the Ministry of the Interior, yet joined the 20th of July plotters. He supplied the British with intelligence for three and a half years before the war and during its initial phase. He then became a major OSS contact.
There are only uncertain indications that he was linked to the Rote Drei. One source reported that Gisevius had contact with Rado. His relations with the Swiss police were excellent, and he was on good terms with quite a few Swiss businessmen, one of whom was Emil Georg Buehrle of the Oerlikon machine and tool works. His ties to the courier Karl Forstmann have been noted earlier in this account.
We know that Gisevius had intelligence contacts with the Western Allies. Roessler listed Gisevius as a source. There are indications that he knew some members of the Rote Drei net and may himself have been alias "Rot" of that group. But are there also valid indications that despite the confidence which Hans Oster, Goerdeler, and others in the Loth of July group seem to have accorded him, he may have been an RSHA agent too? One report stated that Himmler's secretary had so identified him. Some post-war interrogations of German intelligence officers include their comments that Ernst Kaltenbrunner, RSHA chief and Schellenberg's superior, received reports from Gisevius as late as April 1945. The record contains other references to links between Gisevius and Heydrich, as well as Gisevius and Schellenberg. Such reports, however, are likely to be unreliable. All 20th of July participants became unpopular with most Germans. When Gisevius went to the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials in 1946 as a witness for Hjalmar Schacht, he became also a highly effective witness for the prosecution, hence doubly unpopular in post-war Germany. That some denunciations were inspired by rancour therefore seems highly probable. At first blush it appears odd that he was allowed to remain as a German intelligence officer in Switzerland after the RSHA assimilated the Abwehr, despite the fact that the Gestapo issued an arrest order for him in August 1944. But it should be recalled that Goerdeler, sentenced on 8 September 1944, was not executed until February 1945 because Himmler hoped that the contacts of such men with the Western Allies might save his own skin later. On balance, then, it is considered that Gisevius had intelligence contacts with the Americans, the British, the Swiss, and perhaps the Soviets, but not with Nazi Germany, except for his major role in the resistance.
The Stage and the Actors
This account has said next to nothing about the Swiss role in the drama of the Rote Drei. Today Switzerland tends to seem just the scenery of the story: the picture-postcard, snow-frosted backdrop against which the action was played out. But this aura of passivity, of being uninvolved, is really illusory. The fact is that certain Swiss officers were very directly a part of the activity of the Rote Drei. Understandably, this involvement remains a source of some concern to the Swiss, even today, because it is at odds with that strict neutrality which Switzerland has proclaimed for centuries as buckler and breast-plate.
The traffic, however—that obdurate record on which we have tried to base as much of this account as possible—plainly reveals Swiss involvement. When arrests were made, Moscow asked why Rote Drei members in contact with the Swiss authorities—Lucy, Pakbo, Long—did not get more information from them.40 The Swiss General Staff was a sufficiently valuable source to have been given the Rote Drei cover name of Luise. Lucy's contacts with Swiss military intelligence preceded his work in the Rote Drei, and the same is very likely true of Pakbo and certain others.
At least two Swiss officers should be mentioned here. The first is Brigadier Colonel Roger Masson, now dead, who was the chief of Swiss wartime intelligence. The second is Major Hans Hausamann. Before World War lI began, Hausamann had recognized that Switzerland, already teeming with the spies of other nations, was itself sadly lacking in military intelligence and in sources to provide it. In Teufen, near St. Gallen, be established an unofficial intelligence center, funded actually or nominally by himself and certain friends. When war came, this office, known as the "Bureau Ha," was linked to the official Swiss Army intelligence structure. Quite deliberately, however, the Swiss chieftains did not incorporate the office into the army but left it largely autonomous. It is reasonable to conjecture that this preservation of unofficial or only semi-official status resulted chiefly from the significant fact that a Bureau Ha outside the official framework could be far freer of the shackles imposed by neutrality than any part of the government could be.
Dr. Xaver Schnieper worked as a junior officer in the Bureau Ha. He introduced Lucy to Major Hausamann. Only the Swiss know today whether the vital information coming from Germany went first to Lucy and then, via Hausamann, to Masson, or whether the Swiss received the bulk of the information from their sources in Germany and passed it to Sedlacek for relay to the British and to Lucy for relay to the Russians. What we can be sure of is that Switzerland was not just part of the World War II scenery; it had a piece of the action.
The story of the Rote Drei in essence, is the tale of two firm camps, between which shuttled ambiguous and uncommitted men. On the one side stood the anti-Hitler German conspirators. There was an East-West schism in their ranks, but they were united and unwavering in their resolve to rid Germany and the world of Hitler. On the other were the Soviet armed forces and intelligence services, also committed to Hitler's destruction but only as a step toward the same domination of the earth that Hitler had longed for. Both groups, the tiny and the vast, were made up for the most part of dedicated activists. Between the two forces were Roessler and certain of his associates: Wirth, Mueller, Lemmer, Gisevius, Horkheimer, probably Thormann, perhaps Joachim Oster. These are a different breed from such 20th of July figures as Hans Oster, Goerdeler, and Beck. During the 19431945 period, at least, Lucy, Lemmer, et al, were psychologically much more akin to Himmler, Kaltenbrunner, and Schellenberg than to the heroes of the resistance, the Soviets, or even such Rote Drei figures as Rachel Duebendorfer.
These were the men who posed as arbiters, as intellectuals who had preserved their integrity by being above it all. But the truth is that they did not say, "A plague on both your houses." They dickered. They sought advantage—private material advantage—from many quarters. Roessler, Blun, Lemmer, and the rest could have been replaced by any others willing and able to live well in wartime Switzerland; their roles were essential, though not very important, but they themselves, as individuals, were not of consequence.
The true heroes of the tale are those few Germans living in an age of appalling complexity, and of rottenness at the highest levels of their government, so that they were forced not only to risk a barbaric death but to deal unequivocally with the fact that what morality demanded of them was treason.A few of them were Lt. General Ludwig Beck, suicide; Lawyer Hans von Dohnanyi, hanged; General Erich Fellgiebel, hanged; Dr. Carl Friedrich Goerdeler, hanged; Reichskriminal-direktor Arthur Nebe, hanged; General Friedrich 01bricht, hanged; Major General Hans Oster, hanged; General Fritz Thiele, hanged; Field Marshall Erwin von Wilzleben, hanged.
Lucy and his Rote Drei associates lived on.
Comment: Only the books and other publications consulted directly during the preparation of this article have been listed in this bibliography.
1. Karl Heinz Abshagen, Canaris, English edition, Hutchinson and Co. Ltd., 1956.
2. Pierre Accoce Books and Pierre Quet, La Guerre a été Gagné en Suisse, Paris, Perrin, 1966.
(The remaining versions of this book are the following:
Moskau Wusste Alles, translated from the French by R. J. Humm, Schweizer Verlag A. G., Zurich, 1966.
The Lucy Ring, translated from the French by A. M. Sheridan Smith, W. H. Allen, London, 1967.
A Man Called Lucy, translated by A. M. Sheridan Smith, CowardMcCann Inc., New York, 1927.)
3. Margret Boveri, Treason in the Twentieth Century, MacDonald and Co. Ltd., London, 1961.
4. Gert Buchheit, Der Deutsche Geheimdienst, Geschichte der Militaerischen Abwehr, List Verlag, Munich, 1966.
5. David J. Dallin, Soviet Espionage, Yale University Press, 1955.
6. Allen Welsh Dulles, Germany's Underground, MacMillan and Co., New York, 1947.
7. Wilhelm F. Flicke, Agenten Funken Nach Moskau, Verlag Welsermuehl, Wels-Muenchen, 1957.
8. Alexander Foote, Handbook for Spies, Museum Press Ltd., London, second edition, 1964.
9. Hans Bernd Gisevius, To The Bitter End, Houghton Mifflin Co., New York, 1947.
10. Jon Kimche, Spying for Peace, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1961.
11. Rudolf Pechel, Deutscher Widerstand (German Resistance), Eugen Rentsch Verlag, Erlenback-Zuerich, 1947.
12. Gerhard Ritter, The German Resistance, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1958.
13. Rudolf Roessler, Die Kriegssehauplaetze and die Bedingungen der Kriegsfuehrung (The Theaters of War and the Conditions for Conducting It), Vita Nova Verlag, Lucerne, 1941, Printed under the alias R. A. Hermes.
14. Wilhelm Ritter von Schramm, Verrat im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Econ Verlag, Dusseldorf Vienna, 1967.
15. William F. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1960.
1. Anonymous, "Hans Oster:' from International Biographical Archiv (Munzinger Archiv ), 8 December 1962, p. 1128.
2. Anonymous, "Joachim Oster," from International Biographical Archiv (Munzinger Archiv), 10 June 1967, Lieferung 23/67.
3. Anonymous, "Rudolf Roessler," from International Biographical Archiv (Munzinger Archiv), 29 December 1966, Lieferung 51-52/66.
4. Anonymous, "The Second World War Traitors at the Fuehrer's Headquarters," Der Spiegel, Hamburg, 16 January 1967, pp. 30-44.
5. Anonymous article, Stern, Hamburg, No. 20, 15 May 1966, pp. 7-9.
6. Anonymous text, Tass, International Service in English, 20 February 1968, citingKomsomolskaya Pravda.
7. Malcolm Muggeridge, "The Lucy Mystery," The Observer Review, London, 8 January 1967.
8. Rudolf Strobinger, "The Man Whom No One Knows," Testimony of the Intelligence Service Worker, Prague, Lidova Demokracie, 24 September 1967.
9. Burke Wilkinson, review in The New York Times of 11 June 1967 of A man Called Lucy.
* Editor's Note. This article is an abridgement of a longer study of the Rote Drei. The portions omitted in this version mainly concern biographical and other details relating to the sources and sub-sources of the principals in the organization.
1 Studies X11, 3, p. 41.
2 There is some difficulty with the term message, because some holdings preseni as one unit what others treat as two or more.
3 Our holdings indicate that September 1943 was a busier month than most for the Rote Drei transmitters; if the traffic had been all one way, the figure of 4,250 would be high. On the other hand, no messages from Moscow to Switzerland were found at the Hamels'. An analysis of all traffic presently available has suggested that about two-fifths originated in Moscow. If therefore we add 1,700 to our projection (40 per cent of 4,250) the total becomes 5,950.
4 In his Agenten Funken each Moskau, 1957 edition, Neptun Verlag, Kreuzlingen, Switzerland, Flicke presents 68 messages, of which 57 are matched in our holdings and 5 more are partial matches (Flicke's versions being incomplete). It is suspected that the remaining 6 messages are spurious, the creations of Flicke or someone else. These messages differ from those known to be authentic in certain minor ways but consistently. All of these messages, if they were genuine, would have been transmitted before the sending date of the earliest authenticated message. One of them is the early warning of Hitler's attack, a message that later commentators accepted as genuine.
5 Alexander Foote, Handbook for Spies, Museum Press, Ltd., London, second edition, 1964, p. 161.
6 Another of whom was Brigette Lewis (Long).
7 Our notes fail to reflect what happened to Caspari.
8 Foote, op. cit., p. 133. Although Foote says of Boettcher, "I cannot speak for the British, but be certainly was not connected with our network" (P. 67), he is as wrong here as at many other points. The traffic leaves no doubt that Moscow regarded Sissy and Paul Boettcher as a team and often addressed them jointly.
9 A Man Called Lucy, Coward-McCann Inc., New York, 1966.
10 Moscow did not usually use the true first name of an agent as his radio cover name, but evidence in the traffic itself makes it plain that "Paul" was Sissy's common-law husband Paul Boettcher.
11 Tamara had her own code name, Vita, and one may wonder at Poliakova's indiscretion in not using it; but such lapses were not rare. On 6 December 1943 a message from Dora informed Moscow that Foote had been arrested. He was named openly as Foote instead of being designated as Jim.
12 In so doing Poliakova referred not to Maurice but to Marius, so that there is a possibility that the two were identical. It has also been suggested, however, that Marius was Marius Mouttet, a Frenchman and former Socialist Minister. Foote (op. cit., p. 92) mentions him but says nothing of an arrest.
13 This literal interpretation of Mann has been used because Sissy at this time was still married to Duebendorfer, a Swiss citizen.
14 Sissy, Paul, and Vita were arrested later, in May 1944.
15 op. cit., p. 66.
16 Studies XII 4, p. 104.
17 Others who might have supplied Lucy with information but might also have been otherwise linked to the Rote Drei were Bill, Bireher, Fanny, Fernand, Schwerin, and Stefan. None of them appear often in the traffic; none reported high-level information.
18 Assuming, as we do, that our holdings are large enough so that projections are mathematically sound.
19 To the Bitter End, Houghton Mifflin Co., New York, 1947, p. 142.
20 Karl Heinz Abshagen, Canaris, English edition, Hutchinson and Co., Ltd., London, 1956, p. 122.
21 op. cit., p. 89.
22 op. cit., pp. 176-177.
23 Wilhelm Ritter von Schramm (Verrat irn Zweiten Weltkrieg, Econ Verlag, Dusseldorf-Vienna, 1967, p. 223) and others have made the same curious mistake about Oster and have drawn the same conclusion. They state that lie was suspended from Abwehr duty% on 5 April 1943. But a number of reliable sources have reported that on this date, when Hans von Dohnanyi, Josef Mueller, and Dietrich Bonhoeffer were arrested, Oster merely came under initial suspicion. He was transferred to a reserve status on 19 June 1943 but was not placed under surveillance (or house arrest) until March of the following year. The last known message from Dora which cites Werther or any other possible source of Lucy as the source of the message is dated October 1943. Accordingly, there is no basis in fact for the argument that Lucy's messages continued to flow to Moscow after 20 July 1944, as Accoce and Quet have maintained, or that General Oster could not have been one of Lucy's sources, as von Schramm has maintained.
24 op. cit., pp. 421-422.
25 Anonymous, Munziger Archives, "ME-O: (Oster) 8.12.1962, 1128, Hans Oster (former German general)."
26 op. cit., p. 424.
27 op. cit., p. 122.
28 ibid., p. 132.
29 op. cit., p. 324.
30 ibid., pp. 344-345.
31 The German Resistance, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1958, p. 157.
32 Long was Georges Blun, a French journalist and important member of the Rote Drei.
33 Vladimir Alexandrovich Sokolin is discussed later in this study.
34 There is confirmation of the Blun-Gisevius association.
35 The Swiss G-2 had direct contact with both Pakbo and Long but not with Sissy. This fact probably explains why she was arrested, whereas Long and Pakbo were not.
36 op. cit. pp. 207-214.
37 Our friend Flicke, with his usual horse-sense, identified "Salter" as Erwin John Salter, an English bank clerk.
38 Foote did not believe this story, for which Pakbo was the source. Foote stated that the Rote Drei never received any money from Pakbo.
39 Federal Ministry of Defense, then headed by Theodore Blank.
40 The arrests were made by the police. It is more than possible that the Swiss General Staff was well-informed about the Rote Drei but did not share its insight with the police, for reasons of security.
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