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Edition du 20 février 2011 à 12h59

La Chute de Berlin / Antony BEEVOR (trad. de l'anglais par Jean Bourdier)

En réponse à -3 -2
-1Il y a en effet de quoi douter, mais... de Nicolas Bernard

Une hypothese tres credible pour qui a trace Schellenberg de Etienne Lorenceau le dimanche 09 octobre 2005 à 11h05

Himmler n'avait pas besoin de Goering pour aller chez les freres Wallenberg. Schellenberg les connaissait bien mieux que Goering et Wallenberg avait fait lui meme des rapports aux US indiquant que seule une negotiation avec Himmler pourrait etre couronnee d'effets. Schellenberg avant de discuter avec Hewitt (un ami de Roosevelt)va verifier la credibilite de l'americain avec Jacob Walenberg.

Un court rappel de synthese sur les negotiations de Himmler par Walter Schellenberg:
Peace negotiations
Schellenberg was convinced through Chamberlain and MI6, that the Allies were prepared to form an alliance with Germany against the Bolshevists at negotiable terms.
In 1939, the UK prime minister gives MI-6 the green light to contact those moderate conservative forces seeking to topple the Nazi regime. Chamberlain's long-term wish at this point? To encourage a military coup d'etat that will substitute the bellicose and fanatical Nazi regime for a moderate and law-abiding conservative German government willing to enter into an Anglo-German entente against the perceived menace of Soviet expansionism and its export of Marxist-Leninist revolution. MI-6 gets to work.
The plan to establish contact with conspirators within the German Army High Command is undertaken by SIS Section-Z ("higher political tasks."). Best and Stevens are ordered to probe the waters from neutral Holland and report their findings to Section-Z Chief Lt.-Colonel Claude Dansey. They are under SIS Chief Menzies's explicit instructions to use go-betweens to establish contact with persons believed to be in touch with the Beck-Goerdeler- Canaris faction.

Stevens and Bests
November 1939: Venlo negotiations (nazi bluff)

Wallis Simpson and the Duke of Windsor
December 1939-March 1940: Operation Willi (nazi bluff)

May 10 1941: Rudolf Hess flight: Hess had mentioned Hitler's and Ribbentrop’s previous overtures to the Duke of Windsor via the Prince of Hesse and Prince Coburg-Sax Gotha. (Bluff)

Maximilian Eugen zu Hohenlohe-Langenburg and Lindemann
July 1942: Using Prince Maximilian Eugen zu Hohenlohe-Langenburg (in contact with the British ambassador in Switzerland) and Lindemann (president of the Nord Deutscher Lloyd steamship line) he arranged a meeting, but called by Himmler WS delegates Paeffgen to Hohenlohe for obtaining the meeting with Sir Samuel Hoare.
Source: US NARA RG 165, July 1945 declassified January 1995, “Report on the case of Walter Friedrich Schellenberg” British-US interrogation of Schellenberg p.29-30
(Contact with Hohenlohe Jan/Feb 1942 and Madrid later in July 1942)
November 1942: Hohenlohe did establish contact with Sir Samuel Hoare and with the British military attaché General Torr, but WS failed to supply Himmler’s support. Pitzi, Hohenlohe’s assistant, had separately scured a meetin with American military attaché Col Rousseau and hisassistant Col Demarest in Lisbon. Same cause: same consequence.
Early August 1942, at the Zhitomir meetings, WS allegedly suggests Himmler to start negotiating with the allies.

1942: Langbehn: Stewart Menzies, Donovan, Admiral Canaris projected meeting in Spain

September 8 1942: WS meets for the first time Masson, at the request of the Swiss.
Source: Nara. Harrison, G. W. Final Report on WS. p.35
LeBor, Adam. Hitler’s secret bankers. The myth of Swiss neutrality during the holocaust. p.163 claims that Eggen was Brigadefuehrer.
The tale of the boxes seems far fetch, Masson knew that if he was drawing German attention on the boxes (if they ever existed: check with French docs) the German would keep some copies and his request would not only supply no relief for Switzerland but it would unnecessarily revive German attention on two years old documents. Now since the Swiss had their Viking network, the request for retrieving the documents may have found its source in the German network.
The results of the meeting also reveal that WS, despite his statements on the consequences from Luther’s arrest, still had some influence in the German Foreign Office and knew it.
Inconsistent with his general statements on Ribbentrop.
October 16 1942: WS and Eggen cross the border into Switzerland and are driven by Col. Masson’s driver to Paul Meyer-Schwertenbach’s house by the Lake Constance.
Source: Nara: Harrisson, G. W. Final report on WS p 41-42
Again this stinks: there is no mention of the Red Orchestra. This tends to point at WS as potentially a Russian spy. Masson could have simply been manipulated.
Harrisson’s report dates this meeting around Mid December post dating it by two mmonths: why? What happens for WS during these two months or what doesn’t happen which should have happened? The report claims, that the meeting was organized by Paul Meyer.

Hoare through Max von Hohenlohe
November 1942: Max von Hohenlohe was general agent for Skoda works in Western Europe and WS secured military service exemption for his secretary Spitzi. New meeting between WS and Max von Hohenlohe in order to try and extend peace feelers to Sir Samuel Hoare in a near future. Hohenlohe objects that Himmler’s support is too vague, but agrees to travel to Spain. There they establish a contact with both Sir Hoare and General Torr, the British Military attaché in Madrid. Hohenlohe had already been in contact with the Swiss Foreign Minister in Berne Pilet-Golaz with a view of starting peace discussions through Vatican channels.
In the meantime Spitzi had made a contact with the US Military attaché in Lisbon, Colonel Rousseau and his assistant Colonel Demarest. At that time, WS being unable to secure a renewed support from Himmler after Zhitomir, the negotiation came to nothing.
Source: Nara: Final report on WS p 39-40

Geheimrat Kreuter
November 1942: Geheimrat Kreuter had effected, after WW I, considerable transactions for the Ruhr industry and secured a loan for Germany in an amount of 400,000,000 Dutch Guilders, the undertaking going under the name Trede Fina. As Kreuter had close connection with the large US law firm Dillon Reed and with Admiralty Chief Admiral Forestall, WS did authorize Kreuter to transfer the greater part of the funds pertaining to this loan to an unblocked and freely negotiable French exchange account in free French Francs in France. Kreuter was suspected of espionage by Goering’s Forschungsamt and WS apparently cleared him up against the permission for WS to place 10 young Germans for training at the Galeries Lafayette. WS did obtain Funk’s support for the transfer of the funds. The talks betzeen Kreuter and WS never went further than a discussion on a separate peace with Americans.
Kreuter was arrested by the Staatspolizei at the end of 1944 on the suspicion of espionage on behalf of America but WS guaranteed his bona fide and he was released.
Source: Nara: Harrisson G. W. Final report on WS p 39-40

Dr Hitter, Dr. Jung and Archbishop Temple.
November 1942 and April 1943 Dr Hitter, the specialist of “Tiefen Psychologie” (depth psychology) at the Charite Hospital in Berlin working to the “rebirth of the Christian soul in the German people”, who was in touch with Archbishop Temple and the psychoanalyst Jung, gets in Switzerland with the visa arranged by WS. A little later he sends a message back through a certain Dauffeld explaining that the only solution for Germany laid in the overthrow of Hitler.
Nara Final Report on WS p39

Frl Hanfstaengl
March 1943: At Himmler’s suggestion, WS meets with Frl Hanfstaengl. She owned a shop in Munich and was the notorious Putzi Hanfstaengl’s sister, former member of Hitler’s intimate circle of friends, who had flown to Roosevelt in 1934. Because of her brother’s exploits Frl Hanfstaengl had received a great deal of attention from Hitler and there had been, at a time, rumours of marriage between the two. She was claiming to be on familiar terms with W. Churchill and acquainted with Unity Mitford. She was furthermore very close to Himmler’s wife who underlined her husband, her friend’s ability to undertake peace talks in proper circle.
Source: Nara: Final report on WS p 44

German consul in Tangier, Dr. Rieth
Summer 1943: Based on the belief that he had to break a chicken and egg situation (Himmler will not back him up if he doesn’t have a serious offer from the allies and the allies will not make a serious offer if he doesn’t have a solid backing), WS opened discussion in Berlin with the German consul in Tangier, Dr. Rieth. This Dr. Rieth had a considerable position with large interests in oil and many connections with England and even more with America.
Rieth expresses the view that Germany should pull out of the war and that negotiations should be undertaken immediately with America.
It was agreed that Rieth would proceed with extreme caution. Rieth work for Ribbentrop was also an additional risk, admittedly limited by Rieth deep dislike of the German Foreign Minister.
Despite this promising start, Rieth negotiations did not result in anything concrete.
Source: Nara. Final Report on WS. p.54

Hewitt negotiations: initiated by Felix Kersten
November 4 1943: Felix Kersten had urged WS for a few days to meet with one of his American patient Abrahm Hewitt.
Source: NARA, RG 226, Box 2, Entry 125-A,Folder 21, OSS X-2, Stockholm PTS 5, Interrogation of Walter Schellenberg 16 July 1945.: See Waller the Devil’s doctor p250

Coco Chanel negotiations
April 1944: Operation Modelhut: attempt linked to Max Hohenlohe's one and rejected par Churchill through Hoare. It can be analyzed as ahad no chance to get through

Joel Brand
July 1944, he has the deal presented to Joel Brand: Jews against trucks at a 1 truck for 100 human beings rate. WS hides not to be linked to the mass murders of Jewish people but he is visible behind the attempt through Six and von Klages. WS involvement in the Zeppelin operations shows he had full power to put and take people in and out of concentration camps (contrary to some very good historians statements). He was also managing the false currrency production... in concentration camps! He later had an affair with Cococ Channel in Paris at the Ritz were his nightly visits are recorded

Karl Marcus
November 1944 Karl Marcus nego
Source: Steven Dorril MI6 p 101

Schellenberg also wanted his own trusted officials to handle any overtures to the West. He helped to scuttle a proposal from Wilhelm Harster, commander of the Security Police and SD in Italy, to use an Italian industrialist named Marinotti as a secret envoy: Schellenberg and Harster were not on good terms. An operation codenamed West-Wind was rejected at the highest levels of the RSHA
William W. Butterworth negotiations
From 1962 to 1968, William W. Butterworth was U.S. Ambassador to Canada. Also a Princeton graduate, he first was posted to Canada as a junior diplomat in 1932 (146). In 1941, he attended the fourth and last bi-annual "Conference on Canadian-American Relations", coming to Queen's University as Chief of the British Empire Unit of the U.S. Department of Commerce (147). With him at the conference were two other men with prominent careers in U.S. espionage: 1) Calvin B. Hoover, who, by his own account, began intelligence work for the U.S. government in 1933, and 2) William P. Maddox, a Princeton University professor who became an OSS colonel in charge of intelligence operations in London (148). Butterworth served during WWII as an economic warfare specialist in Spain and Portugal and became one of two OSS contacts with Germany's chief of military intelligence, Walter Schellenberg (149). The other contact was Allen Dulles, eventually to become head of the CIA. After the war, along with Merchant, Butterworth was posted to Nanking (150)

1945: Schellenberg attempts to bluff Dulles into alleging a pact between Hitler and Stalin. A scheme already used in other negotiation attempts.
NARA, RG 226, Box 2, Entry 110, telegram from OSS Bern N0 8139, April 1945.: See Waller the Devil’s doctor p250

1945 Musi in Switzerland.

count Folke Bernadotte
1945 negotiation with count Bernadotte when Himmler keeps ordering the killing of Denmark Jews (see Kaltenbrunner’s defense at Nuremberg)

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